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Abstract 
South African courts have experienced a rise in the number of 
cases involving schemes that promise a return on investment 
with interest rates which are considerably above the maximum 
amount allowed by law, or schemes which promise 
compensation from the active recruitment of participants. These 
schemes, which are often referred to as pyramid or Ponzi 
schemes, are unsustainable operations and give rise to 
problems in the law of insolvency. Investors in these schemes 
are often left empty-handed upon the scheme’s eventual 
collapse and insolvency. Investors who received pay-outs from 
the scheme find themselves in the defence against the trustee’s 
claims for the return of the pay-outs to the insolvent estate. As 
the schemes are illegal and the pay-outs are often in terms of 
void agreements, the question arises whether they can be 
returned to the insolvent estate. A similar situation arose in 
Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg 2015 ZASCA 158 (26 October 
2015). The point of contention in this case was whether the 
illegality of the business of the scheme was a relevant 
consideration in determining whether the pay-outs were made 
in the ordinary course of business of the scheme. 
This paper discusses pyramid schemes in the context of 
impeachable dispositions in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 
1936. 
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1 Introduction 
The South African courts have experienced a steady increase in the 
number of cases involving schemes that promise a return on investment 
with interest rates which are considerably above the maximum amount 
allowed by law, or schemes which promise compensation for the active 
recruitment of participants.1 These schemes, which are often referred to as 
pyramid or Ponzi2 schemes, are unsustainable operations which result in 
problems in the law of insolvency.  
This paper discusses pyramid schemes in the context of impeachable 
dispositions in terms of the Insolvency Act.3 The relevant principles of the 
law of insolvency will be set out first, followed by a description of the 
operations of a typical pyramid scheme. The question as to whether or not 
the law will enforce transactions or contracts emanating from pyramid 
schemes will then be discussed in the light of recent case law. Lastly, 
comments will be made on some aspects of these cases. 
2 Some relevant general principles of insolvency law 
The sequestration of the estate of an insolvent person is aimed at 
equitably distributing his assets among his creditors.4 The trustee or 
liquidator of the insolvent estate is tasked with the duty of collecting, by 
any possible legal means, all the assets of the estate, in order to benefit 
the creditors of the estate.5 In performing this task, the Act allows a trustee 
or liquidator to apply to the High Court for an order setting aside 
dispositions made by a debtor before the sequestration of his estate.6  
                                            
*   Zingapi Mabe. LLB (UP), LLM (UP). Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, 
University of South Africa. Email: mabez@unisa.ac.za. 
1  See Fourie v Edeling 2005 4 All SA 393 (SCA) para 1 (hereafter Fourie v Edeling); 
Moodaley v King 2009 ZANCHC 52 (30 October 2009) (hereafter Moodaley v King); 
Janse van Rensburg v Botha 2011 ZASCA 72 (25 May 2011) (hereafter Janse van 
Rensburg v Botha); Gazit Properties v Botha 2012 2 SA 306 (SCA) (hereafter Gazit 
Properties v Botha); Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths 2014 2 All SA 670 (ECP) para 
17 (hereafter Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths); Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg 2015 
ZASCA 158 (26 October 2015) (hereafter Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg). See 
generally Woker 2013 SA Merc LJ 237. Hereafter, the male gender will be used as a 
matter of convenience. It is not meant to discriminate in any way. 
2  The word "Ponzi" originates from a Mr Charles Ponzi in the 1920’s in Boston, who 
was known as a swindler because of his money-making scheme that cost investors 
millions upon the collapse of the scheme. Hereafter, these schemes shall be referred 
to as pyramid schemes as a matter of convenience. 
3  Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (hereafter the Insolvency Act or the Act). 
4  Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly’s Insolvency Law para 1.2. 
5  Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly’s Insolvency Law 130. 
6  See ss 26, 29-31 and 34 of the Insolvency Act.  
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The Act defines a disposition as any transfer or abandonment of rights to 
property and includes a sale, lease, mortgage, pledge, delivery, payment, 
release, compromise or donation, or a contract for any payment, release, 
compromise or donation, or a contract for any of these, by the insolvent.7  
Only the general principles relating to dispositions made not for value,8 
voidable preferences9 and undue preferences10 will be discussed in this 
paper. These are the types of dispositions referred to in the case law to be 
considered here.  
2.1  Dispositions made without value 
Dispositions made without value include those dispositions which the 
insolvent made before the sequestration of his estate, but for which he did 
not receive any value in return.11 This may happen when an insolvent 
disposes of his property without receiving adequate compensation or 
benefit in return, and the disposition results in the sequestration of his 
estate.12 
The court may set these dispositions aside under two circumstances: 
firstly, where the disposition was made more than two years before the 
date of sequestration of the insolvent’s estate, and the trustee can show 
that directly after the disposition was made, the debtor became insolvent;13 
and secondly, where the disposition was made within two years of the 
date of the sequestration of the estate. In the latter case, the court will not 
set the disposition aside if the person who benefited from the disposition 
shows that directly after the disposition was made, the debtor’s assets 
exceeded his liabilities.14  
2.2 Voidable preferences 
Voidable preferences are those dispositions made by an insolvent within 
six months before the sequestration of his estate, which have the effect of 
                                            
7  See s 2 of the Insolvency Act. Also see Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 5.31.2; 
Bertelsmann et al Mars para 13.3. 
8  See s 26 of the Act. 
9  See s 29 of the Act. 
10  See s 30 of the Act. 
11  See s 26 of the Act; Hill v Maria Christ 1927 SWA 50; Estate Wege v Strauss 1932 
AD 76 (hereafter Estate Wege v Strauss); Estate Jager v Whittaker 1944 AD 246; 
Rousseau v Visser 1989 2 SA 289 (C) 307; Louw v DMA Fishing Enterprises Pty Ltd 
2002 2 SA 163 (SE). See also Bertelsmann et al Mars para 13.2; Sharrock, Van der 
Linde and Smith Hockly’s Insolvency Law para 12.2.1. 
12  Bertelsmann et al Mars para 13.2. 
13  See s 26(1)(a) of the Act; Bertelsmann et al Mars para 13.2. 
14  See s 26(1)(b) of the Act; Bertelsmann et al Mars para 13.2. Sharrock, Van der 
Linde and Smith Hockly’s Insolvency Law para 12.2.1. 
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preferring one creditor over another.15 Like dispositions made without 
value, these dispositions can also be set aside if the trustee or liquidator 
can show that immediately after the disposition was made, the liabilities of 
the insolvent exceeded his assets.16 
However, in the case of voidable preferences, if it can be shown that the 
disposition was made in the ordinary course of the business of the 
insolvent and it was not intended to prefer one creditor over the others, the 
disposition will not be set aside.17 The creditor in whose favour the 
disposition was made thus has this defence, which allows him to keep the 
disposition if he is successful. An objective test is used to determine 
whether or not the disposition was made in the ordinary course of 
business.18  
2.3 Undue preferences 
An undue preference is a disposition made by the insolvent prior to the 
sequestration of his estate, with the intention of preferring one creditor 
over the insolvent’s other creditors, and when, at the time of the 
disposition, his liabilities exceeded his assets.19 The test here is 
subjective, namely whether or not the insolvent intended the disposition to 
have the effect of preferring one creditor over the others, and whether or 
not this was the main purpose of making the disposition.20 
2.4 Section 33 of the Insolvency Act 
Section 33 provides: 
33. Improper disposition does not affect certain rights 
(1) A person who, in return for any disposition which is liable to be set aside 
under section twenty-six, twenty-nine, thirty or thirty-one, has parted with any 
                                            
15  See s 29 of the Act. Bertelsmann et al Mars para 13.13. 
16  See Simon v Coetzee 2007 2 All SA 110 (T) (hereafter Simon v Coetzee); Estate 
Hunt v De Villiers 1940 CPD 79 (hereafter Estate Hunt v De Villiers); Bertelsmann et 
al Mars para 13.13. 
17  See s 29 of the Act; Estate Hunt v De Villiers 79; Pretorius’ Trustee v Van 
Blommenstein 1949 1 SA 267 (O) (hereafter Pretorius’ Trustee v Van 
Blommenstein). 
18  See Hendriks v Swanepoel 1962 4 SA 338 (A) 345; Amalgamated Banks of South 
Africa Bpk v De Goede 1997 4 SA 66 (SCA) 77 (hereafter Amalgamated Banks of 
South Africa Bpk v De Goede); Simon v Coetzee para 114; Gazit Properties v Botha 
309; Bertelsmann et al Mars para 13.17; Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith 
Hockly’s Insolvency Law para 12.2.2(ii).  
19  See s 30 of the Act; Venter v Volkskas Ltd 1973 3 SA 175 (T) 177. 
20  Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly’s Insolvency Law para 12.2.3; Eliasov v 
Arenel (Pvt) Ltd 1979 3 SA 415 (R) 418; Pretorius’ Trustee v Van Blommenstein; 
Cooper v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 3 SA 1009 (SCA) 1016; Gore v Shell 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 521 (C) 530. 
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property or security which he held or who has lost any right against another 
person, shall, if he acted in good faith, not be obliged to restore any property or 
other benefit received under such disposition, unless the trustee has 
indemnified him for parting with such property or security or for losing such 
right. 
(2) Section twenty-six, twenty-nine, thirty or thirty-one shall not affect the rights 
of any person who acquired property in good faith and for value from any 
person other than a person whose estate was subsequently sequestrated. 
This section provides that an investor who received a disposition capable 
of being set aside as a disposition without value, a voidable preference, or 
an undue preference, and who parted with property in return for such a 
disposition, need not return anything he received under the disposition, if 
he acted in good faith.  
The person in whose favour a disposition is made is provided with a 
defence that he acted in good faith, or a further defence to a claim brought 
in terms of section 26, 29 or 30 to have the disposition set aside. However 
this defence cannot be raised if the trustee had indemnified the investor 
for parting with such property. 
2.5 Other relevant legislation  
2.5.1 Section 11 of the Banks Act 
In terms of the Banks Act,21 no person may conduct the business of a 
bank unless such a person is a public company and is registered as a 
bank. Therefore, unless a person is a public company and is registered as 
a bank, that person cannot accept deposits from the general public as an 
ordinary business practice. The Banks Act makes this conduct illegal and 
punishable as an offence.22  
2.5.2 The Consumer Protection Act 
The Consumer Protection Act23 protects consumers against pyramid 
schemes and other related schemes by prohibiting people from promoting, 
knowingly joining, entering into, or participating in multiplication 
schemes,24 pyramid schemes,25 chain letter schemes26 or any other 
                                            
21  See s 11(1) of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 (hereafter the Banks Act). 
22  See s 11(2) of the Banks Act. 
23  See ss 40-46 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (hereafter the CPA) under 
fair and honest dealings with consumers. 
24  Schemes offering interest rates of 20% and above the South African Reserve Bank 
regulated REPO rate. See s 43(2)(a) of the CPA. 
25  Schemes in which the participants receive compensation primarily from their 
recruitment of other participants. See s 43(2)(b) of the CPA. 
26  Actively soliciting or recruiting participants and obtaining compensation for new 
recruits. See s 43(2)(c) of the CPA. 
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fraudulent schemes or scams.27 Prohibited conduct is defined broadly to 
include an act or omission in contravention of the CPA28 and a party who 
engages in such conduct may be liable for an administrative penalty 
imposed by the Tribunal.29  
3 The operation of a pyramid scheme 
As already indicated, pyramid schemes are unsustainable and often 
fraudulent business operations. Although they may attract unsuspecting 
investors, they also attract greedy investors who want to realise large 
returns within short periods of time.30 These investors are enticed by the 
promise of short-term returns on investment with interest rates which are 
considerably higher than average or abnormally inconsistent.31  
These schemes often do not invest the funds received, but use the money 
from new investors to pay extravagant returns to earlier investors.32 They 
are usually doomed to collapse because the income made by them is far 
less than the pay-outs.33 As a result, the scheme eventually collapses 
when the total inflow of funds cannot sustain the outflow of returns 
allegedly due to the participants.34  
When these schemes collapse, they are often insolvent. Once a scheme is 
insolvent, the liquidator or trustee of the insolvent estate collects all the 
assets of the estate.35 To increase the value of the estate, the trustee or 
liquidator may apply to the High Court to have transactions entered into by 
the scheme set aside as impeachable dispositions.36  
The investors who have lost money in the scheme and who are often 
without legal resources themselves become concurrent creditors37 of the 
                                            
27  See s 43(2)(d) of the CPA. 
28  See s 1 of the CPA. 
29  Tribunal means the National Consumer Tribunal established by s 26 of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005. See s 1 and 112(1) of the CPA. 
30  See Paredes-Tarazona v Cobalt Capital (Pty) Ltd 2012 ZAGPJHC 75 (23 April 2012) 
(hereafter Paredes-Tarazona v Cobalt Capital) para 2. 
31  See Paredes-Tarazona v Cobalt Capital para 2. See also Griffiths v Janse van 
Rensburg para 24, where Gorven AJA held that confident tricksters rely on the twin 
weaknesses of people, namely greed and gullibility, to attract investors. 
32  See Paredes-Tarazona v Cobalt Capital para 2. 
33  See Paredes-Tarazona v Cobalt Capital para 2. 
34  See Fourie v Edeling para 1. Also see MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2007 5 SA 521 (SCA) 521.  
35  See s 20(1) of the Act.  
36  See generally ss 26-31 of the Act. 
37  Concurrent creditors are creditors who have not secured preferent claims against the 
estate, and they are paid out of the free residue after any preferent creditors have 
been paid. They therefore do not enjoy any advantage over other creditors of the 
estate of the insolvent. See Bertelsmann et al Mars para 22.13. 
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insolvent estate. In addition, the investors who deposited money into the 
scheme and took their gains without re-investing these funds are often left 
trying to defend applications made to the High Court for the return of their 
investment to the insolvent estate. 
4 Case law 
The question as to whether or not the law will enforce transactions or 
contracts emanating from pyramid schemes will now be discussed in the 
light of recent case law. 
A number of Supreme Court of Appeal cases in South Africa have 
followed a certain approach to determine whether transactions concluded 
by illegal and insolvent pyramid schemes should be set aside, where there 
is a defence by an investor that a contract was concluded in the ordinary 
course of business of the scheme, in the context of section 29 of the Act. 
This approach considers all the facts of the case and has, until recently,38 
never been questioned with regard to its being the custom in such cases.39 
As this approach considers all the facts of a case, it is referred to as the 
broad approach. 
The cases that follow demonstrate how the courts have used this broad 
approach in an attempt to provide a just result for an investor who is 
deceived into investing money in a pyramid scheme and is left empty-
handed after its collapse and insolvency.  
4.1 The broad approach 
4.1.1 Fourie v Edeling  
This case was an appeal against orders in terms of section 26 and 30 of 
the Insolvency Act by Hartzenberg J.40 Hartzenberg J had ruled that the 
Krion Pyramid Investment Scheme41 was insolvent, and that the contracts 
                                            
38  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 25, where it was argued on behalf of the 
defendant that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gazit Properties v Botha revisited the 
broad approach. Brooks AJ in para 27 of this case rejected this contention. 
39  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 17, where Brooks AJ explains that the wide 
approach principle was applied consistently by the Supreme Court of Appeal for 
almost a hundred years, when the Supreme Court of Appeal was still known as the 
Appellate Division. Also see Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg, which restated and 
applied this principle. 
40  See Fourie v Edeling para 4. 
41  This scheme was conducted in a manner that attracted "investors to invest for 
periods as short as three months. When the loan capital with ‘interest’ was repaid at 
the end of the agreed investment period, the investor would more often than not 
reinvest the capital and interest. The advantage for the investor of doing business in 
this way was of course that his already enormous interest was compounded. 
Z MABE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  8 
it concluded with investors were illegal and therefore null and void.42 
Consequently, all actual payments by the scheme from March 1999 were 
set aside as dispositions, because they were made at a time when the 
scheme was insolvent. The dispositions were held to have been made 
with the intention of preferring one investor over the others in terms of 
section 30 of the Insolvency Act.43  
The words "all actual payments" and the reasons provided by Hartzenberg 
J gave rise to interpretational problems.44 It was not clear from the order 
whether this meant that all payments to investors, including capital 
repayments, were set aside, or only the gains of each investor.45  
Conradie JA clarified Hartzenberg J’s order that only the gains of each 
investor were set aside because they were illegal.46 He disagreed, 
however, with the order’s being made under section 30 of the Insolvency 
Act.47 Instead, he held that the order could have been made in terms of 
section 26, which refers to dispositions without value.48 He said that a 
disposition was not made for value if the payment of returns was illegal.49 
A promise to pay returns on payments that were illegal is null, and any 
payment in this regard would be a disposition not made for value.50 If a 
repayment with a book entry did not qualify as a disposition, a pay-out of 
profits retained by the scheme was also not a disposition.51 Only the actual 
payment of the accrued gains would be a disposition without value.52 
It was accepted by the parties before the court that the repayment of an 
investor’s capital was not a disposition without value, and therefore could 
not be set aside as such.53 This was because the investor’s condictio54 
                                                                                                                       
Typically an investor would invest an amount in the scheme having been promised a 
return of 10% per month, capital and profit repayable within three months. Until the 
collapse of the scheme, investors received repayment of their capital and their profit 
when due. Sometimes an investor would leave the capital and/or the profit in the 
scheme and this would then have been reflected by means of a book entry as a 
payment and a new investment. Other investors would take their capital and profit on 
the due date, some of whom returned after a while to reinvest a similar amount." See 
Fourie v Edeling para 1. 
42  See Fourie v Edeling para 4. 
43  See Fourie v Edeling para 4. 
44  See Fourie v Edeling para 5. 
45  See Fourie v Edeling para 5. 
46  See Fourie v Edeling para 16. 
47  See Fourie v Edeling para 16. 
48  See Fourie v Edeling para 17. 
49  See Fourie v Edeling para 18. 
50  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
51  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
52  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
53  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
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prevented it from taking on this character. The disposition was made to 
discharge the responsibility to return the illegal payment.55 
Conradie JA therefore ordered that only actual payments, whether profit or 
interest, in so far as they exceed the investment of each particular 
investor, be set aside as dispositions without value.56 This was under the 
condition that the right of the investor to rely on section 33 of the 
Insolvency Act was not affected by the order.57 In this regard Conradie JA 
held that the court a quo preserved the right in section 33 in its order.58 As 
a result, the capital repayments by the illegal scheme to the investor could 
not be set aside as dispositions without value.  
4.1.2 Moodaley v King 
Another example of a case where the court appeared to have ruled in 
favour of an investor who participated in a pyramid scheme and where the 
court applied Fourie v Edeling is Moodaley v King. In this case Mr 
Moodaley, who was a dentist, his wife, who was a business woman, and 
his son, who was an accountant, invested money in a pyramid scheme 
operated by Mr King. When the scheme collapsed they were left empty-
handed and applied to the High Court for an order against Mr King for the 
repayment of their capital investments and interest.  
Kgomo JP ordered Mr King to repay the capital amounts that the 
Moodaleys had invested, but refused to grant judgment for the exorbitant 
(and illegal) interest that had been promised by the scheme.59 Kgomo JP 
relied on the principle in Fourie v Edeling60 that a disposition was not 
made for value if the payment was illegal.61 A promise to pay returns on 
payments that were illegal is null, and any payment in this regard would be 
a disposition not made for value.62 If a repayment with a book entry did not 
qualify as a disposition, a pay-out of profits retained by the scheme was 
                                                                                                                       
54  The condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam (hereafter condictio) is an unjustified 
enrichment claim based on the fact that the amount claimed was transferred 
pursuant to an agreement that is void and unenforceable because it is illegal. See in 
this regard Afrisure v Watson 2008 ZASCA 89 (11 September 2008); First National 
Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry 2001 3 SA 960 (SCA) para 22; Visser Unjustified 
Enrichment 425. 
55  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
56  See Fourie v Edeling para 20. 
57  In terms of s 26 of the Act. See Fourie v Edeling para 20. 
58  See Fourie v Edeling para 20. 
59  See Moodaley v King paras 12-13. 
60  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. Also see the discussion on Fourie v Edeling in para 
4.1.1 of this contribution. 
61  See Fourie v Edeling para 18. 
62  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
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also not a disposition.63 Only the actual payment of the accrued gains 
would be a disposition without value.64 
4.1.3 Janse van Rensburg v Botha 
In Janse van Rensburg v Botha, the court had to determine whether or not 
the Krion Pyramid Scheme, which later became insolvent, was a debtor for 
the purposes of setting aside transactions it concluded in terms of section 
29 of the Act.65  
The scheme had made certain dispositions to Mr Botha, who had invested 
in the scheme. The liquidators of the estate applied to set these 
dispositions aside in terms of section 29 of the Act.66 In an attempt to 
defend the application and the consequent order to repay the disposition 
into the insolvent estate, Mr Botha alleged, among other things, that 
because the scheme was unlawful and all obligations incurred or 
undertaken were void, the scheme could not be a debtor for the purposes 
of setting aside its transactions in terms of section 29 of the Act.67  
In this regard Heher JA held that illegal acts between the parties have no 
legal consequences.68 However, this does not mean that because an 
agreement is illegal a court will ignore or deny its conclusion and 
existence.69 The conclusion of an illegal agreement allows the law to 
recognise the agreement for particular purposes. The fact that the 
agreements between the parties were void did not take away the legal 
consequences.70 
Thus, Heher JA said that the illegality of the scheme did not deprive it of 
debtor status.71 Section 29 was created to assist in the administration of 
an insolvent estate, and to recover assets disposed of by the insolvent for 
the benefit of creditors.72 It is remedial in nature and should not hinder the 
process.73 
Furthermore, if an insolvent is regarded as a debtor, the illegality of the 
insolvent’s business should not influence a liquidator’s right to utilise 
                                            
63  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
64  See Fourie v Edeling para 19. 
65  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 3. 
66  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 2. 
67  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 3. 
68  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 9. 
69  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha paras 9 and 10.  
70  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha paras 9 and 10. 
71  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 10. 
72  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 10. 
73  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 10. 
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section 29.74 For a proper conclusion in terms of the circumstances of this 
case, the court held that the illegality of the insolvent’s business should be 
disregarded when interpreting section 29.75 In this respect, disregarding 
the illegality of the business would not result in the upholding of an illegal 
contract.76 Heher JA therefore held that the scheme was a debtor for 
purposes of section 29 in respect of any dispositions that it made to 
investors by repayment of capital or interest arising from the operation of 
the scheme.77 
4.2 The narrow approach 
The following cases will demonstrate how the courts deal with the question 
regarding whether or not payments made with regard to illegal pyramid 
schemes qualify as payments made in the ordinary course of business in 
terms of section 29 of the Act. In this regard the Supreme Court of Appeal 
has always applied the broad approach. However, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, in the recent case of Gazit Properties v Botha, appears to have 
departed from this approach and taken a more narrow approach to the 
investigation. 
4.2.1 Gazit Properties v Botha 
This was an appeal against an order made in terms of section 29 of the 
Act, setting aside dispositions made by Malokiba78 to Gazit.79 Malokiba 
operated a pyramid scheme which later became insolvent.80 The inevitable 
happened and the entire scheme collapsed when the new investors’ funds 
used to pay out earlier investors were insufficient.81  
Gazit, an investor in the scheme, loaned an amount of R5 million to 
Malokiba in terms of written loan agreements.82  Gazit would receive 
interest on the capital loan on a monthly basis, and the agreements would 
continue for an indefinite period, subject to cancellation. Gazit cancelled 
the loan agreements and the full capital and interest were paid by 
                                            
74  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 10. 
75  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 10. 
76  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 10. 
77  See Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 8. 
78  Malokiba Trading 19 (Pty) Ltd (hereafter Malokiba). 
79  Gazit Properties Pty Ltd (hereafter Gazit). See Gazit Properties v Botha para 1. 
80  For the operation of the scheme, see Gazit Properties v Botha para 2. 
81  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 2. 
82  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 3. 
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Malokiba.83 Majiedt JA had to determine whether or not these payments to 
Gazit were made in the ordinary course of business.84 
Gazit argued that Malokiba repaid the loans in accordance with his 
obligations in terms of a valid loan agreement in the ordinary course of 
business.85 The liquidators argued that this was not true because the 
business was tainted, and the loan agreements could not be regarded as 
genuine loans.86 They based their contentions on the contravention of the 
Banks Act,87 the excessiveness of the interest paid, and the fact that the 
business constituted a prohibited pyramid scheme.88 However, the 
liquidators subsequently abandoned the last two arguments, and the focus 
was solely on the contravention of the Banks Act.  
Majiedt JA held that the High Court had placed too much emphasis on the 
tainted nature of the transactions whereby Malokiba repaid the loans to 
Gazit.89 Such contamination was found by the High Court to have been 
caused by the violation of the Banks Act and the conclusion of agreements 
under false pretences. Majiedt JA said that the focus should not be on the 
nature of the insolvent’s general business practices. Instead, the 
disposition should itself be scrutinised, taking into account its cause.90  
Majiedt JA referred to Estate Wege v Strauss.91 It was held in that case 
that if a debtor paid a debt in terms of his contract, such a payment would 
have been made in the ordinary course of business.92 Majiedt JA 
interpreted this to mean that one first has to consider the nature of the 
obligation in terms of which the disposition was made.93 
Majiedt JA reasoned that based on the uncontested facts and admissions 
by Gazit, the loans had been repaid by Malokiba in terms of the provisions 
of the parties’ loan agreements.94 This was simply a loan agreement 
whereby one party lends money to another, and the latter agrees to return 
the money with interest at a certain time.95 As Gazit had a contractual right 
                                            
83  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 3. 
84  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 4. 
85  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 5. 
86  See Gazit Properties v Botha paras 5 and 6. 
87  See s 11(1) of the Banks Act. 
88  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 5. 
89  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 7. 
90  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 7. 
91  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 8. 
92  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 8. 
93  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 8. 
94  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 9. 
95  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 9. 
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to be repaid upon cancellation, Malokiba had a reciprocal obligation to 
make repayment.96  
Majiedt JA held that the fact that there was a violation of the Banks Act did 
not mean that the loan agreements were not standard loan agreements.97 
He further stated that there was no evidence indicating that Gazit knew 
that Malokiba’s business was illegal.98 
Majiedt JA also distinguished the circumstances of this case from those of 
Janse van Rensburg v Botha. Although in both cases there was an 
application in terms of section 29, a disposition in the ordinary course of 
business was not one of the issues in Janse van Rensburg v Botha.99 
Majiedt JA therefore found that the High Court erred in upholding the 
liquidators’ claim in terms of section 29(1) of the Act.100 
4.2.2 Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths 
In this case Brooks AJ was faced with the same question as in Gazit 
Properties v Botha, namely whether or not payments made in terms of an 
illegal pyramid scheme qualified as payments made in the ordinary course 
of business. The case involved a pyramid scheme that had been 
conducted through the Usapho Trust (Trust), and which was sequestrated 
on 14 September 2000.101  
Mr Griffiths, an investor and creditor of the scheme, made substantial 
payments to the scheme.102 The first payment, an amount of R100 000, 
was transferred as capital by Mr Griffiths to the Trust on 15 December 
1999.103 This amount was to be repaid by the Trust on 23 March 2000. As 
repayment, the Trust deposited the capital amount of R100 000 on 27 
March 2000 into Mr Griffiths' bond account.104 As interest on this capital 
amount, Mr Griffiths received an amount of R12 000 from the Trust on or 
about 27 March 2000.105 
The second capital payment, an amount of R100 000, was transferred by 
Mr Griffiths to the Trust on 6 April 2000. As per their agreement, on 3 June 
                                            
96  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 9. 
97  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 10; Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Bpk v De 
Goede para 97A-D. 
98  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 11. 
99  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 14. Also see Janse van Rensburg v Botha para 3. 
100  See Gazit Properties v Botha para 15. Also see the discussion of Janse van 
Rensburg v Botha in para 4.1.3 of this contribution. 
101  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 1. 
102  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 2. 
103  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 12.3.1. 
104  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 12.3.1. 
105  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 6.3. 
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2000 the capital sum of R100 000 was then deposited back into Mr 
Griffiths’ bond account by the Trust.106 Again on 3 June 2000 Mr Griffiths 
received interests in the amount of R12 000 on the capital amount.107 
In total, four separate payments were made by the Trust to Mr Griffiths; 
two capital payments and two interest payments. The plaintiffs sought an 
amount of R224 000 in total as payment for each of the four payments 
made to Mr Griffiths, and the interest on those payments.108 
The plaintiffs firstly based their claims on section 26 of the Act, but 
concentrated on the alternative claim based on section 29 of the Act.109 Mr 
Griffiths claimed that the repayments had been made in the ordinary 
course of business. The Trust was obliged to repay all the capital amounts 
because they were paid in terms of their loan agreement.110  
Brooks AJ stated that an objective test is used to determine whether or not 
a disposition is made in the ordinary course of business.111 The terms of 
the transaction and all the circumstances under which it was entered into 
need to be considered.112 Essentially, the question is whether or not it 
could be said that it is normal for solvent business people to conclude 
such transactions.113  
He explained that this approach has been consistently applied by 
judgments coming from the Supreme Court of Appeal for a long time.114 
He referred to Fourie v Edeling, where Conradie JA held that investments 
in a pyramid scheme are illegal and therefore void.115 Brooks AJ applied 
the view in Fourie v Edeling that a disposition made in the ordinary course 
of a business means a "lawful" disposition made in the ordinary course of 
a "lawful" business.116  
Brooks AJ rejected the viewpoint that the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Gazit Properties v Botha revisited the objective approach.117 He disagreed 
with the submission that Gazit Properties v Botha departed from the 
                                            
106  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths paras 12.3.3-12.3.4. 
107  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 6.3. 
108  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 2. 
109  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths paras 3-4. 
110  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 3. 
111  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 16. 
112  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 16. 
113  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 16. 
114  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 17. 
115  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 20. Also see the discussion of Fourie v 
Edeling in para 4.1.1 of this contribution. 
116  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 23. 
117  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 24. 
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principles set out in the Supreme Court of Appeal judgments.118 In his view 
the source of the investigation in that case was much narrower than the 
facts in the other cases before the Supreme Court of Appeal.119  
He adopted the view that the complaint in Gazit Properties that the 
disposition had not been made in the ordinary course of business was 
restricted to two narrow issues: the alleged contravention of the Banks 
Act, and the allegation that investors entered into the transactions under 
false pretences.120 Brooks AJ failed to understand the court’s conclusion, 
namely that the manner in which the investors were misled was 
fraudulent.121 He regarded the basis of the liquidators’ complaints to be 
limited, and not to extend to the disposition having been made to Gazit 
Properties as part of an illegal pyramid scheme. He regarded this as the 
distinguishing factor between the factual circumstances of each of the two 
cases.122  
Brooks AJ found it unlikely that what Majiedt JA meant by saying "what is 
required is a close scrutiny of the disposition itself [sic], viewed against the 
background of its [sic] causa" was intended to restate and express the 
objective test differently.123 He took the standpoint that Majiedt JA had 
recognised the relevance of the broad approach and endorsed the nature 
of the enquiry.124 The finding in Gazit Properties v Botha that the 
disposition was made in the ordinary course of business must be limited to 
the facts of that case, where the broad approach remained intact.125  
Brooks AJ concluded that the dispositions made to Mr Griffiths could not 
be said to have been made in the ordinary course of the business of the 
Trust.126 The illegality of the business operations, the manner in which 
participation in the scheme was secured, and the exorbitant returns on the 
investment contributed to such a conclusion.127 The court accordingly 
ordered the four payments, which consisted of the two capital payments 
and the two interest payments, to be set aside as voidable preferences 
under section 29 of the Insolvency Act.128 Mr Griffiths was therefore 
ordered to pay R224 000. 
                                            
118  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 27. 
119  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 27. 
120  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 27.4. 
121  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 27.4. 
122  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 27.4. 
123  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 28. 
124  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 28. 
125  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 30. 
126  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 31. 
127  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths para 31. 
128  See Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths paras 34, 37. 
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4.2.3 Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg 
This case was an appeal arising from the above judgment by Brooks AJ in 
Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths, which set aside both capital and interest 
payments as voidable dispositions. In this appeal it was conceded by the 
parties that the two amounts of R12 000 representing interest were not 
made in the ordinary course of business, and Mr Griffiths accordingly 
agreed to an order to have them set aside.129 The issue in this appeal was 
therefore whether or not Mr Griffiths had proved that the two capital 
dispositions were made in the ordinary course of business.130 
Gorven AJA restated and applied the objective test that in determining 
whether or not a disposition had been made in the ordinary course of 
business, the disposition should be evaluated in light of all relevant 
facts.131 Gorven AJA also restated the question to be answered, namely 
whether or not it is normal for ordinary, solvent business people to 
conclude transactions as did the parties in this case, in similar 
circumstances.132  
He agreed with Brooks AJ that Gazit Properties v Botha applied the well-
known broad test, but disagreed with the suggestion that the test had been 
narrowed.133  
He also agreed that the investment agreements in the present case were 
illegal and void, whereas the loan agreement in Gazit Properties v Botha 
was valid and enforceable.134 He further held that the dispositions in this 
case were certainly not made in the ordinary course of business.135 
However, he was of the view that Brooks AJ’s finding based on the 
dictum136 that it must be a lawful or valid disposition made in the ordinary 
course of a lawful business went too far.137  
He referred to the statements by Brooks AJA that ordinary, solvent 
business people do not enter into unlawful agreements or attempt to 
obtain unlawful dispositions.138 However, Gorven AJA indicated that this 
cannot be said in respect of the requirement that the disposition must be 
                                            
129  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 9. 
130  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 9. 
131  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 11. 
132  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 11. 
133  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 15. 
134  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 16. 
135  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 16. 
136  See the dictum per Scott AJ in Klerck v Kaye 1989 3 SA 669 (C) 676B-D. 
137  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg paras 16-17. 
138  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 17. 
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made in the course of a lawful business.139 Gorven AJA gave the example 
of a Trust leasing premises and concluding agreements with a municipality 
to render services.140 In such a case, payments to the municipality and 
rent to the landlord would not be set aside as not having been made in the 
ordinary course of business.141 
He held that the abovementioned dictum ignored the nature of the 
business relationship between the insolvent and the recipient at the time 
that the disposition was made.142 As a result, attention shifted to the 
general nature of the business, as opposed to the business relationship 
between the insolvent and the recipient.143 Therefore in Gazit Properties v 
Botha the business operations contravened the Banks Act, but the 
relationship between the parties was concluded in terms of an enforceable 
loan agreement.144  
Gorven AJA accordingly held that Brooks AJ erred in applying the dictum, 
because he failed to focus on the relationship between Mr Griffiths and the 
Trust.145 As a result, the basis on which Mr Griffiths relied in his claim to 
retain the two capital dispositions was misinterpreted.146 He agreed that 
the agreements were illegal and void, as per Fourie v Edeling. However, 
the claim for repayments should have been based on the condictio ob 
turpem vel iniustam causam147 for the immediate repayment of the two 
capital sums.148 The court therefore had to determine whether or not a 
payment under the condictio qualified as one which was made in the 
ordinary course of business.149 In this regard, Gorven AJA said that had 
Mr Griffiths made claims in terms of the condictio, he would have been 
successful. The dispositions would then have derived from lawful and 
enforceable obligations.150  
Gorven AJA reiterated that Mr Griffiths should have focused on the 
dispositions themselves.151 Mr Griffiths did not raise the condictio because 
                                            
139  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 17. 
140  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 17. 
141  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 17. 
142  See Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg para 18. 
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he was unaware that he had a valid claim under the condictio.152 If he had 
been aware of this and demanded payment of the capital under the 
condictio, his relationship with the Trust would have arisen from the 
condictio.153 Unfortunately, in this case, the business relationship between 
the parties arose from the void agreements and not from the condictio.154 
Gorven AJA emphasised that the test to determine whether dispositions 
were made in the ordinary course of business in terms of section 29 of the 
Act is still objective. It considers whether at the time, and under the 
circumstances in which the dispositions were made, they gave effect to a 
valid underlying causa.155 In this case the payments were made in 
accordance with the terms of the investment agreements.156 The 
dispositions must therefore be treated in the same way as the interest 
payments, because they were part of the same transactions.157 Gorven 
AJA accordingly confirmed the decision of the High Court that the capital 
repayments had not been made in the ordinary course of business, and 
were therefore correctly set aside.158 
5 Commentary 
When a debtor in insolvency proceedings is a pyramid scheme, the 
illegality of the scheme gives rise to problems. The common problem that 
is evident from the cases that have been discussed above relates to the 
impeaching of the transactions of the pyramid scheme. As the facts of 
each case differ, the courts have to scrutinise each case to determine 
whether or not a disposition can be set aside as an impeachable 
disposition, and if so, to what extent.  
As indicated, section 33 of the Insolvency Act provides that an investor 
need not restore anything received under a disposition if he can show that 
he acted in good faith. Section 33 therefore provides an investor who is 
ordered to return a disposition made by an insolvent debtor with a defence 
against such an order.  
However, proving that an investor acted in good faith could be difficult. 
This is because there are those investors who, genuinely and out of 
ignorance, do not know that the scheme is fraudulent and invest money, 
consequently losing some or all of their investments. There are also those 
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smart investors who are aware of the illegality of the scheme, but intend to 
use the scheme to make quick money. These investors advance money 
into the scheme, receive the illegally promised profits, and do not reinvest 
the money back into the scheme.  
The former investors seem to be the most disadvantaged by pyramid 
schemes, as they may have received little or no profit from their 
investment. They become concurrent creditors of the insolvent estate and, 
because they might not have received any repayments from the scheme, 
section 33 appears not to apply to them. This is because section 33 
indicates that the investor must have received a disposition that is capable 
of being set aside as a disposition without value.  
On the other hand, the latter investors appear to be the least 
disadvantaged by the scheme. This is because they received repayments 
from the scheme. Although they may be required to pay back the money, 
they can still rely on section 33, provided that they can show good faith. 
However neither section 33 nor the courts indicate the factors that must be 
presented to show that the parties acted in good faith in such 
circumstances. Neither section 33 nor the courts indicate whether, if the 
investor succeeds in showing good faith, he will be required to repay only 
the illegal gains, or if he will be entitled to keep the capital repayments, 
together with the illegal gains.  
In Fourie v Edeling Conradie JA did not comment on whether or not the 
investor acted in good faith, and preferred just to mention that his ruling 
should not in any way affect the investor’s right to rely on section 33.  
In Moodaley v King Kgomo JP appears to have made a just judgment in 
applying Conradie JA’s judgement in Fourie v Edeling. The outcome 
avoided the situation where the court refused to assist the Moodaleys 
because they had participated in an illegal scheme, thereby leaving Mr 
King, the originator of the scheme, in possession of the illegal profit. The 
court also avoided enforcing an illegal arrangement by refusing to order Mr 
King to pay the Moodaleys what had been promised by the scheme. 
However Kgomo JP’s comment that the Moodaleys were: 
… a sophisticated and educated nucleus of people who could not have been as 
gullible as Dr Moodaley, the first plaintiff, who testified for the family 
pretended,…159 
gives the impression that he was not convinced that the Moodaleys acted 
in good faith.  
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From the above discussion it is clear that pyramid schemes are illegal and 
that the courts will not enforce agreements emanating from them, or at 
least will not enforce the illegal part of the agreement. However, the law is 
not always so just to investors or participants of pyramid schemes when 
the estate of the originator of the scheme is sequestrated. Upon the 
sequestration of the estate of a debtor, all the assets of his estate vest in 
the trustee of the insolvent estate.160 The trustee acts in the best interests 
of the creditors of the estate and may apply to the High Court for an order 
setting aside transactions concluded by the insolvent with investors. 
Should the court grant these orders, the investor may have to pay to the 
insolvent estate the money that was paid by the insolvent estate to the 
investor as a return on the investment.161  
This outcome was seen in Janse van Rensburg v Botha, where Heher JA 
held that just because the scheme was illegal, this did not mean that the 
agreements which it concluded did not have legal consequences. Seeking 
to give effect to section 29 of the Act, Heher JA disregarded the illegality of 
the agreements entered into by the illegal scheme. He held that for the 
purposes of the dispositions made by the scheme, the scheme is a debtor 
and should incur the legal consequences of a debtor. In this respect, the 
legal consequences were to set aside the disposition and claim the money 
back for the creditors of the insolvent estate. 
The challenge arises, however, when an investor decides to rely on one of 
the defences against the setting aside of dispositions. Such a defence 
would include that in section 29 of the Act, one element of which is that the 
disposition was made in the ordinary course of business. As already 
indicated, the objective approach is followed by the courts to determine if 
the disposition was indeed made in the ordinary course of business.  
Although the appeal court in Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg restated the 
objective approach, the judgment did not clear up the inconsistency 
brought about by Gazit Properties v Botha; instead, the appeal court 
created further uncertainty about what the objective approach entails. In 
both Gazit Properties v Botha and Janse van Rensburg v Griffiths, it was 
clear that all the facts of a case have to be considered. Gorven AJA in 
Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg criticised the long-standing dictum162 for 
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overlooking the nature of the relationship between the parties and focusing 
solely on the general nature of the business.  
Although he based his finding on different reasons, Gorven AJA reached a 
finding similar to the one in Gazit Properties v Botha, namely that Mr 
Griffiths should have focused on the disposition itself and not on the 
nature of the business. He held that the focus should have been on 
whether or not the agreement that gave rise to the disposition was a legal 
and enforceable contract. In his explanation he separated the lawfulness 
of the agreement that gave rise to the disposition from the lawfulness of 
the business itself. He said that the focus should be on the nature of the 
business relationship between the parties, and not on the general nature 
of the business.  
He stated that solvent business people do not conclude unlawful 
agreements. Furthermore, he held that in Gazit Properties v Botha, even 
though the business itself was unlawful, the relationship between the 
parties was created by an enforceable loan contract. In contrast, in 
Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg the agreements themselves were illegal 
and void. Therefore, the relationship between the parties was created by 
already illegal and void agreements. Gorven AJA indicated that Mr 
Griffiths should have claimed repayment in terms of the condictio and not 
in terms of the void agreements.  
Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg appears to have introduced a new factor to 
be considered in determining whether or not a disposition is made in the 
ordinary course of business. Although an objective approach investigation 
entails weighing all the facts of a case, Gorven AJA appears to place more 
emphasis on the nature of the relationship between the parties, and totally 
disregards the illegality of the business. 
6 Conclusion 
Although pyramid schemes are illegal and cannot be enforced between 
the parties to such an agreement, in order to give effect to the 
impeachable disposition provisions in the Insolvency Act, the illegality of 
the agreements is disregarded. This outcome was held in Janse van 
Rensburg v Botha not to amount to the upholding of an illegal agreement, 
but to giving effect to the legal consequences that emanate from the illegal 
agreement and, in the main, to recovering assets of the insolvent estate 
for the benefit of creditors.  
It is clear that the objective approach is still the approach to follow in 
determining whether a disposition made by a pyramid scheme was made 
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in the ordinary course of business for the purposes of section 29 of the 
Act. In earlier cases, only the illegal gains made by the investor were set 
aside. This outcome was based on the dictum that a disposition can be 
made in the ordinary course of business only if it was a lawful disposition 
and the business was lawful. In Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg, the most 
recent decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court set aside the 
issue of both the illegal gains and the capital repayments. The court held 
that the focus should be on the nature of the relationship between the 
parties and not on the illegal nature of the business. This Supreme Court 
of Appeal case, however, created further uncertainty and inconsistency 
regarding which factors to consider or to which factors more weight must 
be given.  
An investor who acted in good faith in participating in the scheme may rely 
on section 33 of the Act in the case of a claim by the trustee or liquidator in 
terms of sections 26, 29 and 30 to have the disposition set aside. Having 
shown good faith, however, is difficult to prove, and neither section 33 nor 
the courts have indicated the factors that show good faith and whether or 
not, if good faith is shown, the investor can keep both the capital 
repayments and the illegal gains. This uncertainty may give rise to further 
Supreme Court of Appeal cases in this regard. 
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